Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development
Volume 21, Spring 2007, Issue 2

Article 1

The Supreme Court's Federalism Revival and Reinvigorating the
"Federalism Deal"
Preeta D. Bansal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an
authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
selbyc@stjohns.edu.

SYMPOSIUM:
FEDERALISM PAST, FEDERALISM FUTURE:
A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM

THE SUPREME COURT'S FEDERALISM
REVIVAL AND REINVIGORATING THE
"FEDERALISM DEAL"
PREETA D. BANSAL*

Since 1991, the Supreme Court has been dominated by a fiveJustice voting block that some commentators argue has reflected
a judicial philosophy based on judicial restraint: the notion that
unelected judges should defer to settled precedents and to the
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considered judgments of legislative bodies. Proponents of this
version of judicial restraint contend that judges should give force
to Congressional-made law and narrowly interpret the
Constitution, and should eschew invoking unenumerated
constitutional principles or broadly interpreting the scope of
constitutional provisions in order to upset judgments of popularly
elected branches of government. A contrary judicial approach,
they argue, would constitute judicial activism or "legislating from
the bench."
At the same time, the same five-Justice block of the Rehnquist
Court that purportedly has reflected this view of judicial
restraint invalidated more than three dozen acts of Congress,
whereas the Supreme Court invalidated only two acts of
Congress in its first 75 years, up until the end of the Civil War.
Much of the basis for this largely unprecedented rate of
legislative invalidation by the Court in the last decade and more
was the revived doctrine of "federalism" - or the notion that
unelected judges should play an active constitutional role in
policing the boundaries of appropriate federal and state
activities. The revival of federalism was based on the view that
states must be accorded the respect accorded to them as joint
sovereigns with the national government, as envisioned in the
original constitutional design of the founders.
But is federalism a meaningful, first-level constitutional
commitment? Or is it a secondary-level, instrumental value (and
occasional doctrinal cover) that yields to ideological or policy
ends? Lawyers, scholars and commentators on both sides of the
political divide have suggested that both the federalism revival,
as well as the critique of it, have been based less on a neutral
commitment to certain structural features of our Constitution,
than on a substantive ideological agenda.
Progressives, for example, note that federalism has been the
mantle by which the Court invalidated important civil rights and
regulatory protections.
One notable commentator, Erwin
Chemerinsky, now Dean at Duke Law School, has written that
"what animates the Rehnquist Court is not a concern for states'
rights and federalism. Rather, the Court is hiding its value
choices to limit civil rights laws and to protect businesses from
regulation in decisions that seem to be about very specific
doctrines of constitutional law, such as the scope of the commerce
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power and the circumstances of preemption."'
Conservative commentators, on the other hand, note that the
critique of modern federalism has been impelled by policy
preferences rather than legal commitments. Michael Greve of
the American Enterprise Institute has written that "[p]erhaps,
one could still argue that the conservative Justices' antiregulatory policy preferences too often override their ostensible
federalism commitments. But if so, one ought to be prepared to
entertain the hypothesis that the same opportunism might be at
work on the liberal side. How is it that Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg, the most implacable opponents of the Rehnquist
Court's federalism, suddenly discover their federalist credentials
2
and affections in preemption cases?"
Whatever the underlying ends, the federalism revival was not,
as Professor Barnett and Professor Devins have noted today, a
consequence of a popular movement or the result of a political
push by the Congress, grassroots interest groups or the American
people to devolve authority to the state level. Nor, as I contend,
was it the result of a "ground-up" movement by coalitions of
states expressing themselves in the Supreme Court and seeking
greater institutional protection through constitutional doctrine.
Rather, a review of states' filings in the Supreme Court's
significant cases during the height of the federalism revival
suggests that the Court's federalism was, in many cases, adopted
by the Court over the desires of states.
This has implications for federalism's future as a judicial
doctrine. In the short paper I present today, I will discuss the
position of the states as reflected in their amicus curiae
submissions in some of the leading cases of the Supreme Court's
federalism revival. I will then offer some observations on the
effects and future of federalism. My basic conclusion is that the
federalism revival has had a salutary effect both on
constitutional doctrine, by reviving the importance of the
1 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters:A Different Approach
to Preemption, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2004); see also Herbert Semmel, It's Not
About States' Rights: Double-Talk by the Activist Supreme Court Majority, in AWAKENING
FROM THE DREAM: CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE AND THE NEW STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL

JUSTICE 239, 239-50 (Denise C. Morgan, Rachel D. Godsil & Jay Moses, eds., Carolina
Academic Press 2005).
2 Michael S. Greve, FederalPreemption:James Madison, Call Your Office, 33 PEPP. L.
REV. 77, 80-81 (2005).
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structural features of the Constitution in protecting individual
rights and liberties, and on policy, by reinvigorating creative
energy and broad involvement at the state level. But its future
effects are contingent upon reviving the flip side of the
"federalism deal" - ensuring robust protections at the national
level for racial, ethnic and religious minorities.
As a
countermajoritarian principle designed to empower sub-national
geographic groups that might not have majority influence at the
national level, and therefore to recognize and enhance geographic
group-based rights at the expense of individual rights at the
national level, federalism is a form of political "affirmative
action" for less populated states that runs contrary to the
individual rights framework of the Bill of Rights protections. The
liberty-enhancing purposes of federalism can, therefore, only be
achieved fully if the Court's commitment to federalism is
accompanied by a vigorous commitment on its part and at the
national level to guaranteeing the individual rights of minorities
- including racial, ethnic and religious minorities - who live
within the sub-national (state) units empowered by federalism.
THE STATES AS AMIu CURIAE DURING THE FEDERALISM REVIVAL:

WINNING "THE STATES' RIGHTS PLEA AGAINST THE STATES
3
THEMSELVES"

The Supreme Court's federalism revival was marked by
heightened solicitude to states in four areas of constitutional
doctrine: Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause,
Congress's powers to enact legislation pursuant to Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment, state sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment, and "reserved" powers under the Tenth
Amendment. Notably, in many of these areas, the Court imposed
federalism against the professed interests and concerns of states.
CongressionalAuthority/Commerce Clause
Perhaps the most dramatic initial area of the federalism
revival was in the Court's announcement of limits to
Congressional authority to enact legislation pursuant to the
3 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 654 (Souter, J., dissenting), see infra text
accompanying note 18.
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Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez, 4 the Court, for the
first time in some 50 years since the end of the Lochner era,
struck down a federal law as outside the Commerce Clause
authority. The only amici curiae brief submitted by states in the
case was in support of federal power and congressional
authority. 5 These states - Ohio, New York and the District of
Columbia - broke rank with the obvious states' rights-sounding
position and filed an amici curiae brief defending the federal
school gun ban. The states acknowledged that "[alt first blush, it
may seem paradoxical that any State would file a brief in this
case in support of the authority claimed by the Federal
government here. But the amici States believe that the historical
cooperation and coordination that has existed between the States
and the Federal government in the area of law enforcement is
both proper and important, and that these longstanding
traditions of complementary efforts should be approved and
upheld in this case." 6 The states noted the increasing "frequency
and severity" of violence in schools, which were straining the
combined resources of state and local law enforcement
authorities, and welcomed federal efforts in this area "to
supplement the continuing efforts of state and local officials." 7
The states further argued that there is a close nexus between the
protection of public safety from gun violence and interstate
commerce, and that "prior congressional findings and common
reason" supported the requisite nexus.8 Notwithstanding this
expressed interest of states as amici, the Court in Lopez it struck
down the Gun-Free School Zones Act.9
Just five years later, a much broader coalition of states
supported the creation of a federal civil cause of action against
gender violence enacted by an overwhelming bipartisan majority
of Congress in the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"). In
United States v. Morrison,10 the Court considered both
Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause and its powers
4 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
5 Brief for the States of Ohio, New York and the District of Columbia as Amici Curiae,
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260).
6 Id. at 1-2.
7 Id. at 1.
8 Id. at 4-5.
9 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
10 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. A 36-state
coalition joined a brief authored by New York urging the Court to
uphold VAWA.11 Only one state, Alabama, asked Congress to
strike down the law. 12 The 36-state coalition noted that the
National Association of Attorneys General had supported the
reauthorization of VAWA, and argued extensive findings by
Congress
demonstrated
that
violence
against
women
substantially affects interstate commerce. 13 The states argued
that this nexus between gender violence and commerce was
supported by many other reports and the states' own experience
- given the lowered productivity, increased health care costs and
other related effects (including depression and homicide) of
gender violence which resulted in a $3-$5 billion annual cost on
businesses.14 The state coalition also agreed with congressional
findings that existing state-law remedies, while substantial and
improving, were still not adequate.15
They cited studies
conducted by 21 state task forces concluding that state reform
efforts do not sufficiently provide redress for gender-based
violence, and that VAWA's civil remedy complements state
efforts, much like parallel state-federal remedies for racial and
other discrimination. 16
The Court disagreed and struck down VAWA's civil remedy as
exceeding Congress' commerce clause authority, beginning with
the conclusion that gender-related crimes are not economic
activity.17 Notably, Justice Souter in dissent noted that thirtysix states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico "have filed an
amicus brief in support of petitioners in these cases, and only one
State has taken respondents' side. It is, then, not the least irony
of these cases that the States will be forced to enjoy the new
11 Brief for the States of Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin, and the
Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Puerto Rico as Amici Curiae, United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29).
12 Brief for the State of Alabama as Amici Curiae, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29).
13 Brief for the States of Arizona et. al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 11, at 2.
14 Id. at 5-6.
15 Id. at 15-16.
16 Id. at 16.
17 United States v.Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
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federalism whether they want it or not. For with the Court's
decision today, Antonio Morrison, like Carter Coal's James
Carter before him, has 'won the states' rights plea against the
states themselves."'1S
Section Five of the FourteenthAmendment
In 1997, the Court for the first time in almost twenty years
addressed the scope of Congress's power to enact legislation
under the enforcement clause (Section 5) of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In City of Boerne v. Flores,19 the Court considered
whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") was a
valid exercise of Section 5 powers, given that Congress had
enacted RFRA "in direct response" to a prior Court decision
which had constricted free exercise rights as they had been
construed in Sherbert v. Verner, and in order "to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner" for free
exercise claims. 20 Fourteen states argued that Congress lacked
authority to enact RFRA,21 and six states joined amicus briefs in
support of Congressional power. 22 The Court held that Congress
lacked power under Section Five to enact RFRA because
Congress had attempted to enact a "substantive change in
constitutional protections," and not a measure "responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." 23
When the Court then considered in United States v. Morrison
whether the civil remedy provisions of the Violence Against
Women Act could be upheld as validly enacted pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment (since the Commerce Clause basis was
not upheld), the Court recognized that "state-sponsored gender
discrimination" might very well violate the Equal Protection
18 Id. at 654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
19 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
20 Id. at 512, 515.
21 Brief for the States of Ohio, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, and the Territories of American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands as
Amici Curiae, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2074).
22 Brief for the States of Maryland, Connecticut, Massachusetts and New York as
Amici Curiae, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2074); Brief for the
State of Texas as Amicus Curiae, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 952074); Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia as Amicus Curiae, City of Boerne v.Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2074).
23 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519, 532.
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clause and thus be the subject of remedial legislation under
Section 5.24 Nevertheless, the Court held that the provisions
were not valid under Section 5 because they were "directed not at
any State or state actor, but at individuals who have committed
criminal acts motivated by gender bias" and thus were not
congruent or proportional to unconstitutional conduct by
States. 25 The Court did not heed the views of the 36 states as
amici who favored the federal legislation on grounds that their
own state justice systems were still plagued by gender bias. 26
Following Morrison, based on the Court's decisions in the
Commerce Clause and Section Five areas, commentators noted
that a full-scale federalism revolution was underway in which
the Court no longer appeared loath to invalidate legislation as
exceeding Congress's enumerated powers.
State Sovereign Immunity/Eleventh Amendment
The consequences of the Court's constricted jurisprudence
concerning the scope of Congress's Section Five powers had
immediate effect in the area of state sovereign immunity. In
Seminole Tribe of Floridav. Florida,2 7 the "Federalism Five" had
adopted a view of state sovereign immunity that was not based
on the text of the Constitution. They posited that the commonlaw doctrine of state sovereign immunity protecting states from
suit in another sovereign's courts had been constitutionalized in
the original document despite the absence of any text to that
effect, and that the Eleventh Amendment merely affirmed and
evidenced this already constitutionalized status for state
sovereign immunity in only one particular circumstance (suits
against a State by citizens of another State) without purporting
to limit the broader constitutionalized principle in the document
itself (extending also to suits against a State by its own
citizens). 2 8 Thus, the Federalism Five concluded that Congress
could not act to alter or abrogate such sovereign immunity even
for suits brought a State's own citizens, because sovereign
immunity was a principle having constitutional status, unless it
24
25
26
27
28

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000).
Id. at 626.
See supra note 11.
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Id. at 64.
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did so by legislation enacted pursuant to a source of
constitutional authority that post-dated the original Constitution
Congress could not, in
- or the Fourteenth Amendment.
legislation enacted under its Article I powers including the
Commerce Clause, purport to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
The confluence of the Court's jurisprudence limiting Section 5
authority with its view that sovereign immunity could only be
abrogated by Section 5 legislation led to a series of decisions
holding that states were immune and could not be sued in federal
court for a range of federal statutory violations - including for
violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act which,
in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 2 9 the Court held had not
been validly enacted pursuant to Section 5.30 Then despite the
majority of states opposing the assertion of state sovereign
immunity in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett,3 1 the Court held that Title I (the employment provisions)
of the Americans with Disabilities Act had not been validly
enacted under Section Five and so Congress could not abrogate
state sovereign immunity for such claims. 32 Even where states
spoke out against the interests of their own fiscs, the Court acted
to "protect" their interests.
1 0 th

Amendment/Anti-commandeering

Finally, the Court's federalism revival was evident in its Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence - again beyond the professed wishes
of the states. In New York v. United States,3 3 the majority of
states did support New York in successfully challenging
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act as violating
the Tenth Amendment on grounds that the provisions

29 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
30 Id. at 82-83.
31 Fourteen states supported the respondents in favor of abrogating state sovereign
immunity, see Brief for the States of Minnesota, Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Vermont, and Washington as Amici Curiae, Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No. 99-1240), whereas seven states supported
the petitioner State of Alabama, see Brief for the States of Hawaii, Arkansas, Idaho,
Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, and Tennessee as Amici Curiae, Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett,531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No. 99-1240).
32 Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
33 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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commanded states to enact legislation. 3 4 But notably, the Court
went even further than what the states advocated and suggested
that even if a state consented to enacting what Congress
commanded it to enact, state legislation enacted at the behest of
a federal directive would be invalid. 3 5 So once again, the Court
took upon itself the responsibility of protecting the states from
themselves, because ultimately, the "constitution protects us
from our best intentions." 36 And in Printz v. United States,37
although 13 states supported the constitutionality of the federal
Brady Handgun Prevention Act at issue 38 (whereas 8 took the
side of state sovereignty 39), the Court invalidated the legislation
for commanding local law enforcement officers to enforce the
federal scheme by conducting background checks in furtherance
of the legislation. 40
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON FEDERALISM

GOING

FORWARD:

THE NEED TO REINVIGORATE THE "FEDERALISM DEAL"

As a jurisprudential framework that began not at the behest of
states or popular pressure but instead arguably as one that was
"top-down" and court-imposed, federalism's future may be
limited, perhaps not unlike other "top-down" court-imposed
movements without consistently strong proponents. This is
especially so because of changes in Court personnel: the Court's
loss of federalism's staunchest proponents - Chief Justice
34 Eighteen states submitted amici curiae briefs in support of New York. See Brief of
the States Of Ohio, Arkansas, Guam, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, West Virginia
and Wisconsin as Amici Curiae, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) Nos. 91543, 91-558, 91-563); Brief of the State of Michigan as Amicus Curiae, New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) Nos. 91-543, 91-558, 91-563); Brief of the State of Connecticut
as Amicus Curiae, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) Nos. 91-543, 91-558,
91-563).
The States of Washington, Nevada and South Carolina were intervenorrespondents in the case.
35 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 182.
36 Id. at 187.
37 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
38 See Brief for the States Of Maryland, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and
Wisconsin as Amici Curiae, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Nos. 95-1478, 951503).
39 See Brief for the States Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, South
Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming as Amici Curiae, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997) (Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503).
40 Printz. 521 U.S. at 935.
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Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the "frontier
Justices" - may result in a dampening of its march. 4 1 Moreover,
the war on terror and the growing internationalization of world
affairs from which legal problems and cases emerge, together
with the trend toward harmonization and uniformity in legal
frameworks in other parts of the world, may make the drive
toward fragmentation and re-centering of authority at the state
level increasingly seem to be quaint nostalgia.
Regardless of its genesis or its future, there is much to be
celebrated with the federalism revival. In the policy arena, the
federalism revival has provided an intellectual tool that has
spurred some states to flex their regulatory authority, which in
turn has had important catalytic and other effects in the
areas. 44
other
and
environmental 4 3
securities, 42
Notwithstanding that as a matter of historical practice state
governments have long conjured up, for many progressives,
notions of backwater politics, resistance to civil rights and other
regressive policies, progressives have increasingly joined the fray
with conservatives at the state level to invest their energies into
reinventing state governments to become effective loci for
regulatory action. 4 5 Of course, one's view of effective regulatory
action at the state level may vary widely, but states are now
drawing upon the energies of actors with a variety of viewpoints
41 Even before their departures from the Court, the Court's federalism zeal seemed to
have dampened. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Congress' Commerce
Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the purely local cultivation and use of
marijuana for medicinal purposes in compliance with California law, even though the
marijuana was entirely home grown and no money changed hands); Tennessee v. Lane,
541 U.S. 509 (2004) (Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as it applies to the
class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid
exercise of Congress' authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce
that Amendment's substantive guarantees); Nevada v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)
(Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity in the Family and Medical Leave
Act, because that Act was validly enacted pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
42 See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and
Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107 (2004); compare Justin O'Brien, The
Politics of Enforcement: Eliot Spitzer, State-Federal Relations, and the Redesign of
FinancialRegulation, 35 PUBLIUS 443 (June 22, 2005).
43 See, e.g., New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (vacating EPA rule that
would have eased clean air rules on aging power plants, refineries and factories as
contrary to Clean Air Act).
44 See, e.g., Franklin Foer, The Joy of Federalism, N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 2005, at sec.
7, col. 1, p. 12.
45 See, e.g., Adam Cohen, Editorial Observer: Brandeis's Views on States' Rights, and
Ice-Making, Have New Relevance, N.Y. TIMES, December 7, 2003, at sec. 4, col.1, p. 12.
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who are operating within the states' political arenas. 46
In the arena of constitutional doctrine, the federalism revival
has had the salutary effect of reestablishing the importance of
the structural features of the Constitution as guarantors of
liberty and freedom. Whereas constitutional law casebooks just a
few decades ago focused perhaps disproportionately upon the
individual rights protections of the Bill of Rights, current
casebooks are more equally and properly divided between the
structural protections of our constitutional system and Bill of
Federalism was, after all, originally
Rights protections.
as a structure of government to promote
and
designed
conceived
individual liberty and protection, not less, amid the vicissitudes
of politics. 4 7 Indeed, the structural features of the Constitution
(federalism and separation of powers) were originally the
principal constitutional guarantors of individual liberty. The
individual rights guarantees of the Bill of Rights later
supplemented the fundamental structural protections in the
original document. The federalism revival helps to restore an
important structural protection of our Constitution for individual
rights and liberties.
But federalism stands opposite the Bill of Rights mode of
protection in important ways that must be recalled in considering
the federalism balance going forward. As a doctrine designed to
empower geographically based groups who otherwise might
48
constitute political minorities in the national process,
federalism may be likened to a kind of affirmative action that
elevates group rights - in the form of membership in a
geographic group - over our constitutional commitment to
individual rights that are not group based. That is to say,
federalism provides an individual voter in a less populated state
such as Nebraska or Wyoming with greater influence at the
national level by virtue of her membership in a geographic group
46 See, e.g., James Traub, The Attorney General Goes to War, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June
16, 2002, at 38.
47 See A.E. Dick Howard, The Values of Federalism, 1 NEW EUROPE L. REV. 143
(1993); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45 KANSAS
L. REV. 1219 (1997).
48 See generally James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary
and Competing Paradigms,47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1259 (1994) (noting that federalism's
commitment to empowering geographically-based minority groups must coincide with a
commitment to protecting "the interests of political, racial, religious or ethnic minorities
within those quasi-autonomous areas").
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(as a resident of one of fifty states) than she would have simply
as one of 250-plus million Americans at the national level
49
alone.
As such, federalism is and can be salutary only when and if the
other part of the "federalism deal" - as one commentator has
termed it - is accepted and reinvigorated: if state communities
are empowered, then "local power with regard to civil rights
issues [must] be constrained" in favor of robust "national
protection and national control of civil rights."50 That is because
federalism may convert minorities in the national political
process into majorities at the sub-national level; empowerment of
these new majorities can only be justified if the "interests of
political, racial, religious, or ethnic minorities within those quasiautonomous areas" are not placed at risk by denying or reducing
their recourse to national institutions and to robust national civil
5
or individual rights protections. 1
If, therefore, the affirmative liberty-enhancing values of
federalism are to be realized and if federalism is not to become
the mantle by which an anti-civil rights ideological agenda is to
be carried out, the revival of federalism and the protection of subnational (state) units must be accompanied by revival of the flip
side of the federalism deal: robust national and judicial
protection for the individual rights of racial, religious or ethnic
49 In reviewing Robert A. Dahl's 2002 book, How Democratic is the American
Constitution?, Hendrik Hertzberg poignantly compares the federalism-enhancing feature
of the Constitution that accords two senators for each state, regardless of population, with
affirmative action:
Even if it were true that the condition of being a citizen of a state with a small population
entails such grievous disadvantages that, to correct for them, the very votes of such
citizens must be assigned a greater weight than the votes of other Americans, how much
is enough? Are the special needs of people who live in small states - people who can, after
all, escape their condition by moving somewhere else - greater than the special needs of
people who are short, or people who are disabled, or (more to the point of American
history) people who are black? Here's a little thought experiment, inspired by Dahl's
reflections. Imagine, if you can, that African-Americans were represented "fairly" in the
Senate. They would then have twelve senators instead of, at present, zero, since black
folk make up twelve per cent of the population. Now imagine that the descendants of
slaves were afforded the compensatory treatment to which the Constitution entitles the
residents of small states. Suppose, in other words, that African-Americans had as many
senators to represent them as the Constitution allots to the twelve per cent of Americans
who live in the least populous states. There would be forty-four black senators. How's
that for affirmative action?
Hendrik Hertzberg, Framed Up: What the Constitution Gets Wrong (summary and review
of Robert Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution?), NEW YORKER, July 29,
2002.
50 Blumstein, supra note 48, at 1253.
51 Id. at 1259.
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minorities within states. Any other notion not only would
subvert the underlying purposes of federalism itself, but also
would result in less individual liberty and less individual rights
protection, which all features of our Constitution - including the
structural provisions and the Bill of Rights - are designed to
preserve.

